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INVESTMENTS BY TRUSTEES.
1. TiLE question as to what arc proper investments for trust
funds, is one of the most important and most frequently recurring
of those which daily suggest themselves to the profession. In some
of our states laws have been passed, or rules have been laid down
by the court protecting trustees from. liability for losses which may
ensue from investments made by them in good faith in specified
securities. In Pennsylvania an executor, guardian or trustee may
apply to the Orphans' Court, and the latter may direct an investment
in the public funds of the United States, of the state, &c. (See
Acts of 1832, 1838, 1850, 1852, &c.) In New York the rules of
the court compel trustees to invest in real securities, or government
bonds, or in the state loan, or in the loans of the New York Life
In.surance and Trust Company: Ackerman v. Enzott, 4 Barb.
626; Smnith v. &Snmt1, 4 Johns. Ch. 281-445. In New Jersey
there is a statute authorizing investments to be made upon applica-
tion to, and direction of, the court. No particular funds are
mentioned, but the court has laid down the rule that investments
must be made in government stocks or real security: Gray v. Fox,
Saxton 259. In Maryland time court does not approve of changes in
investments, unless express power is given in the instrument of trust:
3Yhrray v. JFeinor, 2 Md. Ch. 418; Evans v. Igleiart, 6 Gill &
J. 192; Lynch v. M1"cDonald, 8 Gill 405; and if there be a sur-
plus consisting of money, an investment should be made by the
executor in some safe fund, or on adequate securities under the
authoriiy and direction of the proper court: Evans v. Iglehart, 6
Gill & J. 196-7. In Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan
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and Missouri, the courts may direct trustees as to tlhe manner of
investment, although none are specially pointed out by statute.
In Georgia trustees may invest without danger in the stocks, bonds
or other securities issued by that state. In Mississippi an investment
in bank stocks is permitted. In Indiana a sale made in contraven-
tion of a trust is void: Act of 1852; lodgson v. Ollhey, 8 Ind.
122; Jl'ight v. Buzdy, 11 Ind. 400. In states where there are
no statutes or rules of court which regulate inxestments, trustees
are not responsible for loss where they have acted with prudence
and good faith: (lark v. Gafield, 8 Allen 427. Where there
is a direction to invest on good and sufficient security, the court
will not sanction such as are not permitted by its rules: 1 Beav.
128; 3 Mid. 440; Ryder v. Biekerton, 3 Swans. 80, n. The laws
above mentioned are for the protection of trustees, and do not con-
fine them to such investments as are therein prescribed: Stanley's
Appeal, 8 Penn. 432; Morris v. WYallaee, 3 Id. 319; Hc(ahan's
Appeal, 7 Id. 56; Rush's Est., 12 Id. 378; ffemphill's Appeal,
18 Id. 303; Nyee's _Est., 5 W. & S. 254 ; Johnson's Appeal, 43
Penn. 431 ; Seidler's Est., 5 Phila. 85 ; Barton's .Est., 1 Pars.
Eq. 24; Twaddell's Appeal, 9 Barr 108; 5 Barr 18. Other in-
vestments, however, are in such cases made at the peril of the
trustee, and the fact that his own property has been injudiciously
invested by him in the same manner as that of his eestui que
trust, though it may repel the presumption of fraud, will not free
him from liability for whatever loss may arise therefrom : 43
Penn. 431. Where a power of sale exists, the safe rule is to invest
in legal securities, and where no such power is given an order to
sell should be obtained from the court of proper jurisdiction.
II. Wherever the nature of the trust or the description of tle
property renders the necessity for a sale probable, a power of sale
should always be inserted in the instrument creating the trust. If
that is not given, and a necessity for a sale arise, the power to do
so must be obtained from the proper court, and if trustees sell with-
out such power they would be liable for any loss which might occur
thereby to the eestui que trust. Executors and administrators have
ex virtute offleii, a power to dispose of the decedent's property, so
far at least as not to affect a bond fide purchaser: Bayard v.
Bank, 2 P. F. Smith 232.
III. But the case of a trustee is different. A power of sale is not
necessarily presumed, because usually unnecessary for the fulfil-
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ment of their duties. But they may obtain leave from the proper
court to change investments, provided the court is satisfied that
the change is beneficial. This is the only remedy where the cre-
ator of the trust has given no power of sale, and where the invest-
ment is in the judgment of the trustee dangerous. This power,
exercised by the courts, of directing or authorizing sales, depends,
in the absence of a statute, upon the principle that where the trus-
tee has acted under the direction of the court, he will be protected
by it. Tliis is the case in England, and in those states in which
there are no such statutes as those above mentioned.
It is true that cases occasionally arise where it is desirable to
part at once with trust property, without the delay and publicity of
an order of court. Occasional inconvenience is, however, no excuse
for departing from a rule which, as reason demonstrates, is built on
the most solid foundations. Such inconvenience, too, can only arise
from the carelessness of the creator of the trust or the improper
conduct of the trustee. It cannot occur where a.power of sale is
given to the trustee in the original instrument (and where the power
does not appear it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was intended
to be withheld), and it ought not to arise where having once been
given in the trust instrument, or obtained by the trustee from the
proper court, the power to sell has been exercised for the benefit
of the cestui que trust; for where trust funds are once properly in-
vested, it is almost inconceivable that a necessity should suddenly
arise for changing the security. In a country and at a time where
speculation in stocks has grown to be an epidemic madness,
courts of justice would hardly go out of their way to establish a
rule permitting trust funds to be at the complete mercy of a trustee,
where by the absence of authority on the subject there exists a
strong presumption that the creator of the trust intended to with-
hold from the trustee in the interest of a helpless Cestui que trust
what lie deemed unnecessary powers for the beneficial management
of the estate.
The above remarks are equally applicable to the sale of real and
personal estate. In the Earl of 11rinchelsea v. Noreliffe, 1 Vernon
434, the trustees of an infant saved 30001. out of the profits of his
real estate, and laid it out in the purchase of adjoining lands, the
infant dying within age, it was decreed that the trustees should ac-
count to the infant's executors for the 30001. This ease was argued
before Mr. Justice LuTwIc1r, Lord Chief Baron ATKINS, the
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Chancellor (Lord JEFFREYS,) and the Master of the Rolls,
Sir JOHN CIIURCIIILL. The three former decide.1 that the
trustees were accountable to the executor of the infant, the latter
having died before he was capable of ratifying the action of the
trustees. The Lord Chancellor said (p. 436-7) "lie did agree
that if the trustees had come to this court and obtained a decree
for the investing this money in a purchase, this court would have
maintained its own decree; but 'not having so done, but volun-
tarilfy put an election in an infant, who never made any, lie
thought they remained personally accountable for the 30001. as
being part of the infant's personal estate." So in Awdlhy v.
Awdley, 2 Vernon 192, the committees of a lunatic invested part
of his personal estate in the purchase of lands in fee. The court,
after great debate, and upon reading the statute made touching
the granting of the custody of lunatics, whereby it is provided
that the surplus shall be safely kept and delivered to him, if lie
recover, if not, to be employed upon his death for the benefit of
soul, &c., decreed that the lands purchased be sold and the money
to go, and be divided as personal estate, among the next of kin.
These decisions proceeded on the theory that no unauthorized
conversion of either real or personal estate ought to be made by
trustees by which the course of descent was changed. But Lord
.JEFRPEYS .expressly said that if the trustee had obtained a de-
cree from the court to invest the trust-funds in a purchase, the cout
would have maintained its own decree; from which it may be in-
ferred that if it be for the evident benefit of the cestui que trust,
the court will permit conversion under its own direction, but will
regard with a jealous eye any attempt on the part of trustees to
exceed their:express authority. It has never been doubted that
an express power of sale was necessary to convert real estate into
personalty even where the object of the sale was to reinvest in
real estate, except in some few cases where a power of sale is
necessarily implied. A power generally "to raise a sum" out of an
estate, enables a sale of it : tWareham v. Brown, 2 Vern. 153.
So a proviso, that if one fund should be insufficient to pay his
debts, his executors should raise the same out of his copyhold
premises, authorizes a sale, although they are given by a prior
part of the will to his family: Bateman v. Bateman, 1 Atk. 421;
and however obscurely in a will the intention may be expressed,
yet if it appear that a power of sale was intended, a sale will be
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supported: Warneford v. Thowmpson, 3 Ves. Jr. 513. See Sugden
on Powers, vol. 2, *p. 538. That the rule is the same in regard to
the sale of personal estate may be gathered from several recently
decided case., and from frequently occurring dicta of judges.
In Bayard v. The Bank, 2 P. F. Smith 232, it was held that a
bank was not liable for damages in refusing to allow a trustee to
transfer without being shown the instrument creating the trust,
because it would be liable for allowing the transfer unless authorized
by such instrumcnt. "There is," says Judge STRONG, " a marked
difference between the powers of an administrator or executor, and
those of an ordinary trustee. * * * No purchaser, either of land
or personalty, would be safe in buying from a known trustee without
looking at the nature and extent of his trust. It is true a trustee
may have power to sell, but the power is not a necessary incident
to his trust, as it is to the office of an executor. lie may have the
legal title, and yet have no authority to sell. His sale may be
entirely unauthorized by the instrument that created the trust ; it
may have been forbidden. Why then does not a bank or a transfer
agent act at its peril when permitting him to make a transfer? If
in truth he has no such power, the bank, by accepting his certifi-
cates and issuing others in lieu thereof to his transferree, is assist-
ing him to destroy the rights of the cestui que trust. It has even
been held that a corporation is liable, if it.permit a transfer by a
lunatic holding a legal right, though it had no knowledge of the
lunacy, and was guilty of no actual fault: Chew & Goldsborough v.
Bank of Baltimore, 14 Md. 299. If thus liable when only the
innocent cause of a loss, much more is the liability certain where
the tranfer is permitted with full knowledge that the stock does
not belong to the person who offers to transmit it to another. * * *
There is no case in which it has been ruled that a trustee of stock,
whose certificate shows a declared trust for another named, has a
right to transfer it without showing a power beyond his certificate.
* * * A stakeholder cannot very safely pay over to him who has
the legal right, when he knows another to be the beneficial owner,
With equal reason, at least, ought it to be held illegal for a cor-
poration to aid in destroying the title of a cestui que trust to its
stock without being satisfied that the trustee had authority to part
with and destroy it."
In Lowry v. Commercial and PFarmers' Bank of Baltimore,
Tartey's C. C. Decisions 360, the case was substantially as follows:
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A testator bequeathed some shares of the stock of the Farmers'
and Mechanics' Bank of Baltimore to L. for life, with remainder
over, and the dividends during that time were to be received by
his executors (one of whom was J.), as trustees for L., and l,y them
paid over to her. Eight years after the testator's death J. pro-
posed to transfer the stock which still stood in tile name of the
testator. This transfer was permitted, and new certificates were
made out to the Merchants' Bank of Baltimore, the transferees,
which did not mention the name in which the stock had been held
or that of the vendor. These new certificates were pledged by J.
to the Merchants' Bank as collateral security for a loan. The
executor failed, being a large debtor to the Merchants' Bank, and
a bill in equity was filed by M. against the Commercial Farmers'
Bank of Baltimore and the Merchants' Bank.
The latter was held not liable, because there was nothing to give
it notice of a breach of trust in the conduct of the executor, the
bank always supposing that the stock was his own, and there being
niothing on the face of the certificate to give it notice that he held
the stock as executor. The former bank was held liable:
1. Because, as the stock stood on its books in the name of the
testator, it had constructive notice of this will (see also Ualde-
cott v. Galdeeott, 4 Mad. 190), and the will showed that the stock
was not to be sold, it being bequeathed to M. for life, with re-
mainder over.
2. Though if it had been necessary, the stock might have been
sold by the executor to pay tile debts of the testator, yet, the fact
that he had died rich eight years before the transfer, and that the
time for settling his estate by the executors had therefre long
passed, was abundantly sufficient as constructive notice that tle
executor was misapplying the assets: Keane v. Roberts, 4 Mad.
832-3.
3. Because in -Maryland (as in many other states) an executor
is permitted by Act of Assembly to procure an order of sale from
the Orphans' Court whenever a sale may be necessary, "and the
proposition of one of two executors to transfer this stock, so
long after the death of a wealthy testator, without first obtaining
an order from the court to justify him, must have satisfied any
man of common experience in business that he was grossly
abusing his trust :" Keane v. Roberts, 4 Mad. 334-5. See also
Saxon v. Garrett, 4 Dessau. Ch. 522.
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We may add that, although the testator may have chosen the
same p('rsons to officiate as executors and trustees, after a reasonable
time has elapsed fbr settling the estate, the executors will be con-
sidered to have assumed the character of trustees, and will be
treated by the court as if they and the executors had originally
been different persons.
IV. A corporation for banking purposes, by the charter of
which the stock is only transferable at the bank and by rules estab-
lished by the directors, is a trustee for holders of its stock, and is
responsil)le for any injury sustained by its negligence or miscon-
duct: Lowry v. Bank, Taney's C. C. Decisions 329-30. It is
responsible for the acts of its officers, and must answer for their
negligence or default wherever the rights of a third party are con-
cerncd: p. 300, and Hodges v. Planters' Bank, 7 Gill & Johns.
30K, 310.
In .Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wallace 165, although not necessary
to decide the point in question, Mr. Justice DAVIS says: "But
why chanigc the investment when the canal stock, one of the most
stable of its kind in the country, was paying on the average a
semi-annual dividend of five per cent. ? Experience had shown
that it was safe and yielded a large income, and no prudent
trustee, having once invested in it, and had his conduct approved,
looking alone to the interest of his cestui que trust, would take
the hazard of selling it and purchasing another. But there was
no authority to sell it, even were it desirable to do so, or to deal
with it so that a sale might become necessary. If Jaudon thought
so, there was no foundation for his belief." In that case, by the terms
of the will the trustees had power to invest the whole of testator's
property (except certain specified securities) in the stocks of the
United States, or the stock or funds of any individual state, and
the interest of one-fourth thereof was to be paid to Mrs. Jaudon
for life, with remainder to her children. This was therefore like
the case of Bayard v. The Bank in 2 P. F. Smith, and the dicta
just quoted sustain the rule even more strongly than the case of
Lowry v. The Bank, before referred to, because in the latter case
the bequest of stock was specific. The original trustees did not
sell the stock in question, but Mr. Jaudon, the defendant and sub-
stituted trustee, did so. This was known to and acquiesced in by the
cestui que trust. If therefore, according to the words of Mr. Jus-
tice DAVIS, the trustee could not sell without leave of the proper
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court investments improperly made by himself, and which originally
constituted a breach of trust, d fortiori a trustee cannot sell in-
vestments left by the creator of the trust without leave of court,
in the absence of express power to do so in the instrument
creating the trust.1
V. In his Treatise on Trusts, Mr. Perry says (§ 465), that there
is no sound distinction between original investments improperly
made by trustees and investments made by the testator himself,
and continued by the trustee. In this remark, however, he is not
sustained by the cases, which in ati abundance of instances show
the contrary of this proposition to be true. In England par-
ticularly, where the rule is that an executor or trustee investing in
any funds but the three per cents will be held accountable for loss to
the trust property, there have been repeated instances where in-
secure investments made by the testator resulted in loss, and yet
the trustees and executors, whose duty it was to have changed
them, have been held not liable, because the investments had
originally been made by the testator.
In Lord Dorchester et al. v. Tihe Earl of Effingham et al., Taml.
279 (1829, by Sir JOHN LEACH, Master of the Rolls), executors
depositing moneys belonging to the estate with the same persons as
the testator intrusted with his moneys in his lifetime, although
they were not bankers, were held not liable for a loss sustained by
the latter becoming bankrupt. In Sadler v. Turner, 8 Vos. Jr.
617 (1803, Sir WILLIAM GRANT, Master of the Rolls), the court
refused to call in the property of an infant, upon security in India,
the master reporting it to be for the infant's benefit, that it should
remain invested in India. In Buxton v. Buxton, 1 M. & C. 80
(1835, Sir C. PEPYS, Master of the Rolls), an executor who allowed
part of a testator's assets to remain invested in Mexican bonds for
a year and seven months after the testator's death, and eventually
sold the bonds at a lower price than might have been obtained by
a sale at an earlier period, but who appeared to have acted through-
out with diligence and good faith, was held under the circum-
stances not to be liable for the loss consequent on his not having
sold them sooner. In this case there was a difference of opinion
between the two executors as to the propriety of converting the
'See The Appeal of Pennsyrania Co., 6'c., vol. 31, p. 76 (March 6th 1874) of
Legal Intelligencer. The argument on this point is very fully reported. The
decision went off on another point.
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Mexican bonds at a particular period, which was followed by a de-
mand made by one of them upon the other to concur in effecting
an immediate sale, yet this fact was held not to deprive the latter
of his rights to exercise his own discretion, or render him liable
for the loss that arose from the delay consequent to his declining
to comply with the demand.
In .Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De G. M. & G. 247 (1851), a testator
directed his trustees to invest trust-moneys in parliamentary stocks
or funds, or on real securities, and they omitted so to invest it, but
part of his property at the time of his death was invested in
turnpike bonds. It was held that the trustees under the will were
not cliargeable with the loss which had arisen from the deprecia-
tion in the value of the turnpike bonds since the testator's death.
Sec also Powell v. Evans, 5 Yes. 841 ; Clough v. Bond, 3 M.
& Cr. 496; College v. H7ospital, 9 Pick. 446; Thonmpson v.
Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 628 ; K.night v. Lord Plymouth, 3 Atk.
480; q. c., 1 Dick. 120 ; Rowth v. H1owell, 3 Yes. 565; Wilkin-
son v. Ntat'ord, 1 Ves. Jr. 41; rez v. Emery, 5 Yes. 144 ; Bar-
ton's Est., 1 Pars. Eq. 24; .Murray v. .einor, 2 MHd. Ch. 418;
Brown v. Campbell, Hopkins 233 ; Smith v. Smith, 4 Johns. Oh.
283.
Where the cestui que trust concurs in the breach of trust, he is
estopped from proceeding against the trustee: Brice v. Stokes, 11
Vesey 319 ; Booth v. Booth, I DBeav. 125, &c., &c. ; but he must
know that the acts in which lie concurs are a breach of the trust,
and lie must be capable of acting for himself: Buekeridge v.
Glasse, 1 Cr. & Phil. 135; and neither afeme covert nor an infant
can concur in a breach of trust as they have no authority to con-
tract : 71alker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 80 and cases there cited;
U2derivood v. Stevens, 1 Mer. 717; .Parkes v. White, 11 Vesey
221; Needler v. Bishop of Winchester, Hobart 225; Taylor
v. Glanville, 8 Mad. 98; Smith v. -French, 2 Atk. 243; H, ont-
ford v. Cadogan, 19 Vesey 639 ; Ctresswell v. Dewell, 4 Gif. 460.
A married woman may concur in a breach of trust as regards
estates settled to her separate use, where she procures or induces
the trustee to commit a breach of trust, for there the court treats
her act as an alienation of the estate so far as she had power to
bind it: Crosby v. Church, 3 Beav. 485; Hanehette v. Briscoe, 22
Beav. 496 ; Whisler v. Newman, 4 Yes. 129 ; Parks v. White, 11
Yes. 223 ; Brewer v. Th'irles, 2 Sm. & G. 219; Hughes v. Wells,
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9 Hare 772, 774; ifara v. llanning, Jones & Lat. 311; but where
there is a clause in the instrument against anticipation she cannot
concur in the breach of trust: Clive v. Carew, 1 Johns. & Ilem.
199. A cestui que trust may also be debarred from relief by long
acquiescence in a breach of the trust, though he did not originally
concur in it: Harden v. Parsons, 1 Eden 145; Perry on Trusts,
chap. 28, passim. A neglect to sue for twenty years will bar re-
lief: Brown v. Cross, 14 Beav. 105; Bright v. Legerton, 29 Beav.
60; Hodgson v. Bibby, 32 Beav. 221. But a neglect to sue for a
few years without other acquiescence is not a bar: Knight v.
Bowzer, 2 De G. & J. 421; Cooper v. Greene, 3 De G. F. & J. 72,
74, 77. Nor can any acquiescence be inferred until the cestui que
trust has actual knowledge of the breach: Thompson v. Pinch,
22 Beav. 329, s. c. 8 De G. M. & G. 560; Cooper v. Greene, 3
De G. F. & J. 73; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 487; .i lellish's
Estate, 1 Pars. Eq. 486; Beeson v. Beeson, 9 Penna. 300.
All agreements between the eestui que trust and the trustee are
looked upon with suspicion by the court ; in order therefore that
any acquiescence may have effect, the eestui que trust must have
full knowledge of all the past circumstances of the case: Walker
v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 1; Bandall v. Erington, 10 Yes. 423;
J'yvyan v. VF'vyan, 30 Beav. 65; Eves v. .Hickson, 30 Beav.
142; Bolding v. Lane, 1 De G. J. & S. 119; Cooper v. Greene,
3 De G. F. & J. 74; Fedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 M. & C. 41 ;
Broadhurst v. Balguy, 1 Y. & Col. 16; Downes v. Bullock, 25
Beav. 62.
The law in relation to the subjects discussed, may be briefly
summed up as follows:-
I. Where there is no express power of sale in the instrument
creating a trust, and none is necessarily implied, and the discretion
of the trustee is the sole restriction upon investments, he will
generally be protected where he has acted bond file and with
reasonable diligence and prudence. But in a state where "the
trustee is protected from loss which may arise from certain specified
and so-called legal investments, the rule is much more stringent,
and extraordinary care and diligence is required of the trustee as
well as bona fides, and it is dangerous to invest trust-funds in any
other securities than those thus indicated.
II. But where there is no express power of sale given, and
where none such can necessarily be implied from the nature of the
